Tribal Sovereignty and Resource Destiny: Hydro Resources, Inc. v. U.S. EPA by Brooks, Andrew
Denver Law Review 
Volume 88 
Issue 2 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 7 
December 2020 
Tribal Sovereignty and Resource Destiny: Hydro Resources, Inc. v. 
U.S. EPA 
Andrew Brooks 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Andrew Brooks, Tribal Sovereignty and Resource Destiny: Hydro Resources, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 88 Denv. U. L. 
Rev. 423 (2011). 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact 
jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND RESOURCE DESTINY: HYDRO
RESOURCES, INC. V. US. EPA
INTRODUCTION
One of the schemes Congress enacted for settling the vast expanses
of the western United States was to deed to railroad companies alternat-
ing one-square-mile parcels on each side of the planned railroad.' Subse-
quent sales of parcels helped fund railroad expansion, but also created a
checkerboard of ownerships, sometimes including tribal sovereign own-
ership interspersed with private sections.2 In these areas, Congress at-
tempted to avoid checkerboard jurisdiction with respect to criminal en-
forcement3 by adopting 18 U.S.C. § 1151, a criminal statute that extends
U.S. federal jurisdiction over "Indian country."4 Section 1151 defines
"Indian country" to mean Indian reservations, dependent Indian commu-
nities, and Indian allotments.
In Hydro Resources, Inc. v. U.S. EPA (HRI J),6 the Tenth Circuit
concluded that land adjacent to "parcels held in trust for the Navajo by
the United States"7 was not a "dependent Indian community" under
§ 1151(b).8 As described below, interpretations of § 1151(b) that disre-
gard the word "communities" in the statute result in the same checker-
board jurisdiction that Congress sought to avoid.9 Such interpretations
impact tribal sovereignty by taking from Indian'o communities the power
1. See Hydro Res., Inc. v. U.S. EPA (HRIll), 562 F.3d 1249, 1255 n.3 (10th Cir. 2009).
2. See Hydro Res., Inc. v. U.S. EPA (HRI Ill), 608 F.3d 1131, 1136 (10th Cir. 2010) (en
banc).
3. See Seymour v. Superintendant of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962); see
also Hilderbrand v. Taylor, 327 F.2d 205, 206 (10th Cir. 1964).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006).
5. Id. The fill text of § 1151 reads:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term "Indian
country," as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reser-
vation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issu-
ance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the lim-
its of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extin-
guished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
Id.
6. 608 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
7. Id. at 1137.
8. Id. at 1166.
9. See Seymour v. Superintendant of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962);
HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1174 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (citing KENNETH BOBROFF ET AL., COHEN'S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.04[2][c][iii], at 194 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005)
[hereinafter COHEN'S]).
10. This Comment will use the term "Indian" not out of any disrespect for indigenous popula-
tions, but because of "its use in the relevant statutory language and precedents." HRI III, 608 F.3d at
1136 n.2.
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to control the destiny of valuable natural resources on or under their land:
for example, in the context of HRI III, uranium and drinking water.
Part I of this Comment briefly describes past impacts of uranium
mining on Navajo land, broad principles of Indian sovereignty, the min-
ing process that Hydro Resources, Inc. (Hydro) proposed, the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA), and then discusses the two primary inter-
pretations of § 1151(b): the two-step, multi-factor Watchman balancing
test and the two-part Venetie test. Part II summarizes the majority and
dissenting opinions in HRIIII, including the facts and procedural history.
Part III explains how principles of stare decisis can lead to encroach-
ments on Native American sovereignty and then discusses how a modi-
fied definition of "Indian lands" better aligns with congressional intent,
while enabling the Navajo to control the destiny of its land, drinking
water, and uranium. This Comment concludes that the HRI III holding
contradicts Congress's intent in enacting § 1151, but that this and other
problems may be avoided in the future.
I. BACKGROUND
Hydro has long intended to mine the disputed New Mexican land
for uranium." Past hazards impacting uranium miners, civilians, and the
environment 2 led the Navajo to enact a ban on uranium mining in
2005.'1 Such perils suffered by the Navajo include an increase in cancer
rates,14 contamination of structures built with uranium mining waste, 5
and contamination of groundwater.'6 Notably, the largest nuclear tailing
spill in U.S. history occurred in 1979 on Navajo land.17
Use of the in situ leach method that Hydro proposed using can miti-
gate many of the negative effects associated with conventional uranium
mining. It does not "disturb[] the natural surface, generat[e] dust, or
11. Id. at 1138.
12. See id at 1184 (Henry, J., dissenting) (citing Rebecca Tsosie, Climate Change, Sustain-
ability, and Globalization: Charting the Future of Indigenous Environmental Self-Determination, 4
ENvTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 188, 220 (2009)); see also Ezra Rosser, Ahistorical Indians and
Reservation Resources, 40 ENVTL. L. 437, 441-42 (2010) (detailing the pernicious effects of ura-
nium mining on the Navajo and their land).
13. See Dind Natural Resources Protection Act of 2005, NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§§ 1301-03 (2005).
14. Judy Pasternak, Blighted Homeland: A Peril that Dwelt Among the Navajos, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 19,2006, at 2, http://articles.latimes.com/2006/nov/19/nation/na-navajol9.
15. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF URANIUM
CONTAMINATION IN THE NAVAJO NATION: FIVE-YEAR PLAN 13 (2008), available at
http://www.epa.gov/regionO9/superfund/navajo-nation/pdf/NN-5-Year-Plan-June- I 2.pdf.
16. U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 15, at 17-18; Tsosie, supra note 12, at 220;
Pasternak, supra note 14, at 11.
17. Tsosie, supra note 12, at 220.
18. See In Situ Leach (ISL) Mining of Uranium, WORLD NUCLEAR AsS'N, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf27.html (last updated Mar. 2010).
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produc[e] waste known as tailings."l 9 However, in situ leaching involves
the injection of chemicals into the groundwater to dissolve the uranium
and the subsequent removal of uranium from the recovered solution,20
creating a risk of groundwater contamination. 21 Despite the risks of ura-
nium mining, regardless of method, uranium and other non carbon-based
fuels are poised as the best solutions to the energy needs of the future.22
Based partly on this potential, the price of uranium is currently more than
six times higher than it was a decade ago. 2 3
When mining companies seek to extract uranium on or near Indian
areas, issues arise of jurisdiction and tribal sovereignty. Under U.S. law,
Indian tribes are "domestic dependent nations" 24 that exercise "plenary
and exclusive power over their members and their territory subject only
to limitations imposed by federal law."25 Further, "[t]ribal powers of self-
government are recognized by the Constitution, legislation, treaties, judi-
cial decisions, and administrative practice."26 Accordingly, tribes retain
authority over matters unless and until relinquished by federal legislation
or treaty.27
The following section explains how the federal government deter-
mines whether it will grant permits for in situ leach wells, and then
briefly summarizes the relevant law regarding which government has
jurisdiction over particular areas of land.
A. Underground Injection Control Permitting Authority Under the Safe
Drinking Water Act
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), enacted in 1974, conferred
to the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the power
either to (1) grant Underground Injection Control (UIC) permits, which
19. In Situ Leach and Conventional Uranium-Recovery Methods, TEX. COMM'N ON ENVTL.
QUALITY, http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/permitting/radmat/uranium/process.html (last visited Mar. 28,
2011).
20. See WORLD NUCLEAR ASS'N, supra note 18.
21. See INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, GUIDEBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT FOR IN SITU LEACH MINING PROJECTS 18 (2005), available at http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1428 web.pdf.
22. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, Nuclear, ENERGY.GOv, http://www.energy.gov/
energysources/nuclear.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2011); see also Bruce Finley, Uranium-Mill Plan
Near Naturita Raises Concerns About Toxic Waste, DENVERPOST.COM (Sept. 16, 2010, 1:00 AM),
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_16087508 (stating that uranium will be used "for an anticipated
nuclear-energy renaissance").
23. See UxC Historical Ux Price Chart, UX CONSULTING COMPANY,
http://www.uxc.con/review/uxc_PriceChart.aspx?chart-spot-u3o8-full (last visited Mar. 30, 2011).
The spot price of uranium was about $10 per pound in 2000. On March 28, 2011, the spot price was
$62.50 per pound. See id.; UxC NUCLEAR FUEL PRICE INDICATORS, UX CONSULTING COMPANY,
http://www.uxc.com/review/uxc Prices.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2011).
24. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
25. COHEN'S, supra note 9, § 4.01[1][b], at 210. See generally Aaron Huey, America's Native
Prisoners of War, TED (Nov. 2010), http://www.ted.com/talks/aaronhuey.html (detailing circum-
scriptions imposed on Native American sovereignty by federal law).
26. COHEN'S, supra note 9, § 4.01 [1][a], at 205.
27. See id. § 2.03, at 128, 131, § 3.04[2][a], at 183, § 4.01[1][a], at 206.
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are required for in situ wells to "mitigat[e] the risk of contamination to
potential drinking water sources" 28 or (2) delegate such authority to the
stateS29 or Indian tribes. 30 Additionally, the EPA may exempt aquifers
from SDWA standards that do not now or will not in the future "serve as
a source of drinking water." 31
In 1982, the EPA delegated primary UIC permitting authority in
New Mexico to the State of New Mexico, 32 except for wells "on Indian
lands."33 The EPA has not delegated UIC permitting power to the Navajo
Nation for the type of injection wells in this case,34 so the EPA retains
UIC permitting authority over these types of wells. Therefore, the classi-
fication as "Indian land" of the land on which the wells will ber drilled
will determine whether NM or EPA will exercise UIC permitting author-
ity. To define "Indian lands" under the SDWA, the EPA adopted the
definition of"Indian country" under 18 U.S.C. § 1151.35
B. Section 1151(b) 36
Section 1151, adopted in 1948, codified language from two Su-
preme Court decisions to extend federal criminal jurisdiction over "In-
dian country." 37 In United States v. Sandoval,38 the defendant was crimi-
nally prosecuted for "introducing intoxicating liquor into the Indian
country," the Santa Clara pueblo. 3 9 The defendant challenged the validity
of the statute upon which the indictment was based, and the Court, there-
fore, considered whether Congress could criminalize the introduction of
liquor onto the Santa Clara pueblo. 40 The Court concluded that Congress
could criminalize such conduct and reasoned that the Commerce Clause41
and "an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the
28. HRI III, 608 F.3d 1131, 1138 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc); see Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)-(2) (2006).
29. § 300h-l(b)(3).
30. § 300h-l(e).
31. 40 C.F.R. § 146.4(a) (2011).
32. 40 C.F.R. § 147.1600.
33. 40 C.F.R. § 147.1601.
34. See Hydro Res., Inc. v. U.S. EPA (HRII), 198 F.3d 1224, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 2000). The
type of injection well here is Class Ill. Id. at 1232. Class Ill wells pertain to the in situ mining of
uranium. 40 C.F.R. § 144.6(c)(2) (2011).
35. 40 C.F.R § 144.3 (2011). In adopting the § 1151 definition, the EPA stated that it "be-
lieve[d] this definition [was] most consistent with the concept of Indian lands as the Agency ha[d]
used it in regulations and UIC program approvals to date." Underground Injection Control Program:
Federally-Administered Programs, 49 Fed. Reg. 45292, 45294 (Nov. 15, 1984) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 144.3).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (2006).
37. See§ 1151 hist.n.
38. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
39. Id. at 36.
40. Id. at 38.
41. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
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United States ... the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care
and protection over all dependent Indian communities."4 2
The Court addressed a similar question in United States v.
McGowan.43 There, the defendant was criminally charged with introduc-
ing alcohol into the Reno Indian Colony.4 Noting that the Colony was
"validly set apart for the use of the Indians" and "under the superinten-
dence of the government,"45 the Court determined that the Colony was
established for the "protection of a dependent people."46
The text of § 1151(b), a federal criminal statute enacted in 1948,
codified the "dependent Indian communities" language from Sandoval as
interpreted in McGowan.47
C. Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman 48
In 1995, the Tenth Circuit first declared how to determine whether
an area constituted a "dependent Indian community" under § 1151(b). 49
Relying on basic definitions of "community,, 50 the court in Watchman
employed a two-step test.51 First, a court must determine the appropriate
"community of reference" by weighing "the status of the area in question
as a community" 52 and "the community of reference within the context of
the surrounding area."53 Second, the court must weigh several factors to
determine if the community qualified as a "dependent" Indian commu-
nity: such factors include whether the United States has retained "title to
the lands which it permits the Indians to occupy" and "whether such
lands have been set apart for the use, occupancy and protection of de-
pendent Indian peoples."54
42. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 46.
43. 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
44. Id. at 536.
45. Id. at 539 (quoting United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442,449 (1914)).
46. McGowan, 302 U.S. at 538.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 hist. n. (2006) ("Definition is based on latest construction ofthe term by
the United States Supreme Court in U.S v. ?dcGowan, 302 U.S. 535, following U.S. v. Sundoval,
231 U.S. 28, 46.").
48. 52 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995).
49. Id. at 1543-45.
50. Id. at 1544.
51. Id. at 1543-45.
52. Id. at 1543.
53. Id. at 1544.
54. Id. at 1545 (quoting United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 1981)).
The other two factors were: "the nature of the area in question, the relationship of the inhabitants in
the area to Indian tribes and to the federal government, and the established practice of government
agencies toward the area" and whether there is "an element of cohesiveness ... manifested either by
economic pursuits in the area, common interests, or needs of the inhabitants as supplied by that
locality." South Dakota, 665 F.2d at 839 (alteration in original).
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If the disputed area passed both the "community of reference"
prong and the "dependency" prong of the test, then a court would deter-
mine that the area constituted a "dependent Indian community."5
D. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government56
Subsequent to Watchman, the United States Supreme Court created
a test to find a "dependent Indian community" under § 1151(b). In Vene-
tie, the land in dispute was a reservation until Congress passed legislation
revoking reservation status.57 After the State of Alaska refused to pay a
tax that the Venetie Tribe tried to impose, the district court held that the
Tribe did not have the power to impose such a tax.58 The Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that a six-factor balancing test should be used to de-
termine whether the land constituted a "dependent Indian community." 59
The Ninth Circuit noted that there was only one "significant difference
between" its test and the Tenth Circuit's Watchman test: the Ninth Cir-
cuit "asses[es] the 'degree of federal ownership and control' over the
area in question while the [Tenth Circuit] ask[s] whether the United
States retains 'title' to the land in question."6 o
A unanimous Supreme Court, in 1998, abrogated the Ninth Circuit's
"degree of federal ownership and control" test, holding that the term
"dependent Indian communities" describes lands that "satisfy two re-
quirements-first, they must have been set aside by the Federal Govern-
ment for the use of the Indians as Indian land; second, they must be un-
der federal superintendence."61 Satisfaction of the set-aside prong would
show that an "Indian community" occupied the disputed land.6 2 Fulfill-
ment of the superintendence prong would ensure that the "Indian com-
munity" was "sufficiently 'dependent' on the Federal Government that
the Government and the Indians involved, rather than the States, are to
exercise primary jurisdiction."63 While rejecting the Ninth Circuit's
55. See Watchman, 52 F.3d at 1546.
56. (Venetie II), 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
57. See id. at 524. Reservations were designed to "restrict the limits of all the Indian tribes
upon [American] frontiers, and cause [the Indian tribes] to be settled in fixed and permanent locali-
ties, thereafter not to be disturbed." COHEN'S, supra note 9, § 1.03[6][a], at 64. Tribal members on
Indian reservations are immune to many state taxes. See COHEN'S, supra note 9, § 8.03[l ][b], at 693.
Tribes may tax nontribal members in Indian country. COHEN'S, supra note 9, § 8.04[2][b], at 715.
58. Venetie II, 522 U.S. at 525.
59. Id. at 525-26 (citing Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't (Venetie 1), 101 F.3d
1286, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 1996)). The Ninth Circuit employed the following factors:
(1) the nature of the area; (2) the relationship of the area inhabitants to Indian tribes and
the federal government; (3) the established practice of government agencies toward that
area; . . . (4) the degree of federal ownership of and control over the area; (5) the degree
of cohesiveness of the area inhabitants; and (6) the extent to which the area was set aside
for the use, occupancy, and protection of dependent Indian peoples.
Venetie I, 101 F.3d at 1294 (alteration in original).
60. Venetie 1, 101 F.3d at 1292.
61. Venelie II, 522 U.S. at 527.
62. Id. at 531.
63. Id.
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multi-factor approach, the Court stated that two factors were "relevant":
the "degree of federal ownership" over the area and "the extent to which
the area was set aside for the use, occupancy, and protection of depend-
ent Indian peoples." 64 To summarize, the Ninth Circuit's test differed
from the Court's two-step test in that the Ninth Circuit analyzed the level
of federal ownership and the degree to which the land could be to be
considered a "dependent Indian community" as factors in a multi-factor
test. The Supreme Court used these factors as elements, allowing for a
finding of a "dependent Indian community" only if the federal govern-
ment had set aside the disputed land and also superintended it.65
II. HYDRO RESOURCES, INC. v. U.S. EPA
Petitioner Hydro owns the surface and mineral rights6 6 to land in
northwestern New Mexico, 160 acres of which lie in Section 8, Town-
ship 16N, Range 16W (Section 8).67 The land sits in a checkerboard re-
gion, where land ownership alternates by parcel between "the state, the
federal government, the Navajo Nation, individual Navajos, and private
persons and entities."68 Although Hydro purchased its Section 8 land
outright, 69 it falls within the bounds of the Navajo Church Rock Chap-
ter.70 The Chapter is a "political and social unit of the Navajo Nation,"
with its borders determined by the Navajo.7 In addition, Hydro owns the
mineral rights to Section 17, which is adjacent to Section 8 in the check-
erboard.7 2 However, the "federal government holds the Section 17 land
in trust for the Navajos" and retains most of the surface rights.7
A. Facts and Procedural Posture
In the 1980s, Hydro, not thinking its Section 8 land constituted "In-
dian country," applied to the New Mexico Environmental Department
(NMED) for its UIC permit.74 NMED then requested from EPA an "aq-
uifer exemption" to approve Hydro's application, an exemption that Hy-
dro would need in order to mine.
In 1989, NMED approved Hydro's UIC permit for Section 8, and
EPA approved NMED's request for the aquifer exemption.76 In 1992,
64. Id. at 531 n.7.
65. Id. at 530.
66. HRI III, 608 F.3d 1131, 1141 n.6 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
67. Id.at1136-37.
68. Id. at 1136.
69. Id. at 1134.
70. Id. at 1137.
71. Id.
72. HRII, 198 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 2000).
73. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1141 n.6.
74. Id. at 1140.
75. See id. The SDWA generally prohibits aquifer contamination, but exempts aquifers that
do not now or will not in the future "serve as a source of drinking water." 40 C.F.R. § 146.4 (2011).
76. HRIl, 198 F.3d at 1234.
2011] 429
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Hydro requested that its UIC plan be extended to cover its Section 17
land, and NMED applied for the mandatory aquifer exemption.7 7 In the
mid-1990s, a jurisdictional dispute between NMED, EPA, and the Na-
vajo Nation led the EPA to find the Section 17 land to be "Indian coun-
try" and the status of the Section 8 land to be in dispute.7 8 On Hydro's
and NMED's appeal of the EPA's determination, the Tenth Circuit held
that the EPA did not exceed its authority or abuse its discretion by de-
termining the status of the Section 8 land to be in dispute, and it re-
manded the matter to the EPA to make a final determination as to
whether that land was a "dependent Indian community." 7 9 Separately, the
Tenth Circuit's holding that the Section 17 area constituted "Indian coun-
try" under § 1151(a) was not appealed.80 Therefore, the Section 17 area
falls under EPA jurisdiction81 because the EPA has retained authority
over Class III injection wells on Indian country.82
On remand, EPA concluded that Venetie modified the second step
of the Watchman test, but that the first step-etermining a community
of reference-survived. 83 Applying both steps of this test, EPA deter-
mined Hydro's Section 8 land to be "Indian country."84 Hydro appealed
EPA's decision, and the three-judge panel upheld EPA's land status de-
termination.85 Hydro then petitioned the Tenth Circuit for rehearing en
banc.86
B. Majority Opinion
After finding that it had subject matter jurisdiction,87 that Hydro had
standing,88 and that it would review EPA's interpretation of § 1151(b) de
novo,89 the Tenth Circuit majority turned to the issue of whether EPA
77. Id
78. See idat 1235.
79. Id. at 1254.
80. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1141 n.6.
81. Id.
82. See supra Part 1.A.
83. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1142.
84. Id. at 1143 (quoting U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, LAND STATUS DETERMINATION 13
(2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/region9/water/groundwater/determination-comments/hri-
signed-land-status-determination-feb-07.pdf).
85. HRIIIl, 562 F.3d 1249, 1267-68 (10th Cir. 2009).
86. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1143. The panel held the Section 17 land to be Indian country under
§ 1151(a) and, therefore, the EPA retains jurisdiction. Id. at 1141 n.6. The Section 17 holding was
not appealed. Id.
87. See id. at 145.
88. Id. at 1144-45. EPA challenged HRI's standing on the basis that the "final land status
determination imposed no constitutionally cognizable injury on HRI." Id. at 1144. The majority
agreed with the panel opinion that "the outlay of funds necessary to secure a second UIC permit
from EPA, on top of the one HRI ha[d] already secured from NMED, amply qualifie[d] as a concrete
and particularized, actual and imminent injury." Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id. at 1146.
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was correct in determining that the Watchman "community of reference"
test survived Venetie.90
The majority first looked to Venetie's interpretation of the plain
meaning of § 1151(b). The requirement that the federal government set
aside the land, the majority explained, "ensures that the land in question
is occupied by an 'Indian community."' 9' Next, the federal superinten-
dence requirement "guarantees that the Indian community is sufficiently
'dependent' on the Federal Government." 92 The majority then applied
this test to find that the federal government had not set aside Hydro's
Section 8 land, which Hydro owned outright, and did not superintend the
land. Therefore, Hydro's Section 8 land did not constitute "Indian
country." 94 The court reasoned that if it continued to allow Watchman's
"community of reference" test, land that had not been "set aside by Con-
gress for Indians [could] become Indian country simply because of its
proximity to other lands that are federally set aside and superintended." 95
The majority then provided an illustration to demonstrate this flaw of
Watchman's "community of reference" test.
The majority hypothesized that a couple popping a bottle of cham-
pagne could be charged with a federal crime if they were on land that a
"Navajo Chapter ha[d] asserted for itself."96 The majority reasoned that
only a court could determine, by conducting the "community of refer-
ence" test post hoc, whether the land constituted Indian country. 97 Thus,
the "legality of one's actions would . . . become a . . . guessing game." 98
Such a result would disregard Congress's intent and, therefore, the
Watchman "community of reference" test was no longer valid.99
The majority then reviewed the statute's history to determine
whether the Watchman "community of reference" prong survived Vene-
tie. The majority noted the Venetie Court's reasoning that § 1151(b)'s
"use of the phrase 'dependent Indian community' was intended to codify
language from the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Sando-
val and United States v. McGowan.00 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that
"[n]othing in Sandoval or McGowan suggests that . . . 'dependent Indian
communities' should be determined by a court's perceptions about local
90. Id. at 1147.
91. Id. at 1149 (quoting Venetie II, 522 U.S. 520, 531 (1998)).
92. Id. (quoting Venetie II, 522 U.S. at 531).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1152.
96. Id. at 1161 (explaining that the introduction of alcohol into a dependent Indian community




100. Id. at 1155 (quoting Venetie II, 522 U.S. 520, 527-31 (1998)).
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social, political, or geographic affinities."' 0 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that whether land constitutes a "dependent Indian community"
does not depend on the community, but rather on whether Congress has
set it aside for Indian use and whether it remains federally superin-
tended.102
Finally, the majority examined the statute's structure to determine
the "community of reference" test's survival. Indian reservations, classi-
fied as "Indian country" under § 1151(a), are "traditionally created by
and delineated according to boundaries Congress has set or sanc-
tioned."'03 Similarly, allotments, as recognized under § 1151(c), are "a
product of congressional action."' 04 Section 1151(b) describes areas that
are neither reservations nor allotments, but that are still "explicitly set
aside for Indians by congressional mandate and superintended by the
federal government."io0 Therefore, the majority reasoned, "the creation
of Indian country hinges on some explicit action by Congress." 0 6 Be-
cause Hydro's land did not pass this "explicit action" test, the majority
held it was not a "dependent Indian community." 07 Thus, neither the
federal government nor the Navajo will have control over the aquifer,
and New Mexico will control granting Hydro's UIC permit.
C. Dissenting Opinions
1. Judge Ebel
Judge Ebel disagreed with the majority primarily on the applicabil-
ity of the Venetie test. 08 While agreeing that the Venetie two-part test
applies to the land in question, Judge Ebel argued that a new "commu-
nity of reference" test must be used initially to determine the land in
question before applying the Venetie test.'09 Although the Court in Vene-
tie rejected the Ninth Circuit's multi-factor test, Judge Ebel read Venetie
to allow for consideration of "[t]he degree of federal ownership of and
control over the area, and the extent to which the area was set aside for
the use, occupancy, and protection of dependent Indian peoples."" 0
Judge Ebel propounded a three-step test to determine the appropri-
ate community of reference."' This test would analyze whether the pro-
101. Id. at 1156.
102. Id.





108. See id. at 1168 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1179.
110. Id. at 1177 (quoting Venetie II, 522 U.S. 520, 531 n.7 (1998)). The Navajo Nation agrees.
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posed community had "reasonably ascertainable boundaries," the coher-
ence of the land within those boundaries, and the coherence of "the uses
to which the land is put and the people inhabiting the land."ll 2
Applying this test, Judge Ebel would determine the Church Rock
Chapter to be the appropriate "community."ll 3 Applying the Venetie test
to the Church Rock Chapter, then, Judge Ebel determined that it was a
dependent Indian community and therefore subject to federal jurisdic-
tionl14 because the federal government had set aside most of this com-
munity for Navajo use and superintended it." 5
Judge Ebel also considered § 1151 's purpose of avoiding checker-
board jurisdiction to support employment of a "community of reference"
test.1 6 By looking only to title, Judge Ebel reasoned that the majority's
approach "would completely eviscerate this congressional purpose."' 17
Additionally, Judge Ebel argued that the concept of community in
§ 1151(b) should be afforded "heightened importance" in an environ-
mental context because aquifers extend beyond definite land bounda-
-118ries.
2. Judge Henry
Judge Henry, who agreed with Judge Ebel, wrote separately to un-
derscore his disagreement with the majority's opinion.11 9 Judge Henry
noted that the majority is "veer[ing] away from that fundamental con-
cern" of avoiding checkerboard jurisdiction.12 0 Judge Henry referenced
the "grave consequences," one of which being groundwater contamina-
tion, that previous mining operations have had on the Navajo to explain
his hesitation in applying § 115 1.121
III. ANALYSIS
Both HRI III and Venetie interpreted and applied § 1151(b) because
the EPA used that criminal statute to define jurisdictional bounds under
the SDWA.122 But reliance on § 1151 is inappropriate in the mining con-
text given its pedigree. Further, granting UIC permitting jurisdiction to
the State of New Mexico for in situ wells may lead to the contamination
of a Navajo drinking water source. In the alternative, adoption by the
112. Id
113. Id. at 1180.
114. Seeid.at1182.
115. Seeid.at 1181-82.
116. Id. at 1172-73.
117. Id. at 1172.
118. Id. at 1174.
119. Id. at 1182 (Henry, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 1184.
121. Id.
122. 40 C.F.R. § 144.3 (2011).
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EPA of a different definition of "Indian lands" would respect Navajo
sovereignty while minimizing checkerboard jurisdiction.
A. Section 1151 is a Weak Basis upon Which to Establish Civil Jurisdic-
tion
The Tenth Circuit in HRJ III accepted that § 1151 applied 2 3 because
the EPA tied the SDWA "Indian lands" language to the definition of
"Indian country" under 18 U.S.C. § 1151. 124 Section 1151, though, is a
criminal statute describing where the federal government, rather than a
state, retains criminal jurisdiction.125 Although it is a criminal statute, the
court in HRI III explained that § 1151 had been used "often" to "define
the scope of federal authority over civil and regulatory matters" and cited
page 527 of Venetie and § 3.04[1] of Cohen's Handbook of Federal In-
dian Law.126 First, this section will follow the Venetie trail and then pur-
sue the Cohen's authority to determine the precedential strength of ap-
plying § 1151 to the context of uranium mining.127
1. Venetie
Like the Tenth Circuit in HRI III, the Supreme Court in Venetie
stated that § 1151 "generally applies to questions of civil jurisdiction."1 28
For authority, the Court looked to footnote two of DeCoteau v. District
County Court for the Tenth Judicial District.1 29 In footnote two, the Su-
preme Court in DeCoteau recognized the application of § 1151 to ques-
tions of civil jurisdiction. 30 The DeCoteau Court cited there, as author-
ity, footnotes from three U.S. Supreme Court opinions.
First, the Court in DeCoteau cited a footnote of McClanahan v. Ari-
zona State Tax Commission,132 a case involving Arizona's attempt to
impose an "income tax on a reservation Indian whose entire income de-
rives from reservation sources."' 33 This footnote, however, did not refer
to § 1151.134 Rather, both the footnote itself and the sentence that it sup-
ports stated that consent of the tribe was required for the state to assume
criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian reservations.' 3 5 Therefore, this
authority supports the proposition that tribal sovereignty should be re-
123. See HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1134-35 (majority opinion).
124. 40 C.F.R. § 144.3 (2011).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006); HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1138.
126. HR IIII, 608 F.3d at 1138.
127. Judge Ebel, in his dissenting opinion, cites the additional authority of Enlow v. Moore,
134 F.3d 993, 995 n.2 (10th Cir. 1998), but this trail merely reaches the same destinations as those of
Venetie and Cohen's.
128. Veneie II, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998).
129. 420 U.S. 425 (1975)
130. Id. at 428 n.2.
131. Id.
132. Id. (citing McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 178 n.17 (1973)).
133. McClanahan,411 U.S. at 165.
134. See id. at 178 n.17.
135. See id. at 178 & n.17.
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spected unless the tribe relinquishes it, and not that criminal jurisdiction
statutes, such as § 1151, may apply to questions of civil jurisdiction.
Next, the Court in DeCoteau cited a footnote of Kennerly v. District
Court of Montana,136 a case regarding the attempt of the owner of a gro-
cery store located on an Indian reservation to collect against reservation
Indians who "purchased some food on credit.' 37 This footnote provided
examples of explicit extensions of civil and criminal jurisdiction to states
before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.138 The examples men-
tioned neither § 1151 nor the application of federal criminal statutes to
civil contexts.' 39 Therefore, this footnote does not provide support for the
proposition that § 1151 can be applied to civil or regulatory questions.
Last, the DeCoteau Court cited footnotes five, six, and ten of Wil-
liams v. Lee, 140 a case concerning the attempt of an operator of a general
store on an Indian reservation to collect against two Indians for goods
sold on credit.141 Footnote five mentioned § 1151, but only because it
stated that federal courts have jurisdiction over crimes on Indian reserva-
tions committed against Indians by non-Indians.142 Footnote six did not
mention § 1151, but described congressional grants of civil and criminal
jurisdiction to states. 143 It did not describe how or when federal criminal
statutes have been applied to determine civil jurisdiction.14 4 Neither did
footnote ten mention § 1151; rather, it described a federal statute that
grants federal consent to state criminal and civil jurisdiction over reser-
vation Indians.14 5 This footnote did not describe the application of federal
criminal jurisdiction statutes to questions of civil or regulatory jurisdic-
136. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 428 n.2 (citing Kennerly v. Dist. Court of Mont., 400 U.S. 423,
424 n.l (1971)).
137. Kennerly, 400 U.S. at 424.
138. Id. at 425 n.1.
139. Id.
140. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 428 n.2 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 n.5, 221 n.6,
223 n.10 (1959)).
141. Williams, 358 U.S. at 217-18.
142. Id. at 220 n.5. Footnote five also cites a previous edition of Cohen's, which discusses
federal criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian country by and against Indians and
non-Indians. See U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 307 (1958). Crimes committed by
Indians against Indians are ordinarily subject to tribal jurisdiction. Id. 319. Crimes committed by
Indians against non-Indians in Indian country are ordinarily subject to federal jurisdiction. Id. at 320.
Crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians are ordinarily subject to federal jurisdiction. Id. at
323. And crimes committed by non-Indians against non-Indians are ordinarily subject to state juris-
diction. Id. at 324.
143. Williams, 358 U.S. at 221 n.6.
144. Id. Footnote six also cites to the 1958 Revision of Cohen, but only to refer the reader to a
discussion of special Indian laws relating to Oklahoma. See U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, supra note
140, at 985.
145. Williams, 358 U.S at 223 n.10. Subsequent to this opinion, "Congress passed the Indian
Civil Rights Act which changed the prior procedure to require the consent of the Indians involved
before a State was permitted to assume jurisdiction." McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz.,
411 U.S. 164, 178 n.17 (1973) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a)).
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tion.14 6 Therefore, these footnotes do not provide support for the proposi-
tion that § 1151 can be applied in civil or regulatory contexts.
2. Cohen's 3.04[1]
In addition to Venetie, the court in HRI III also cited Cohen's Hand-
book on Federal Indian Law to support its proposition that § 1151 has
been applied to civil issues. 14 7 Section 3.04[1] of Cohen's, in relevant
part, states that the "modem definition of Indian country is found in the
criminal code, but applies in the civil context as well." 4 8 The footnote to
this statementl 49 references, as one authority, a footnote from a case' 50
which, in turn, cites DeCoteau, described above.
As another authority, the Cohen's footnote instructs the reader to
see Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation,s a case regard-
ing the power of Oklahoma to "impose income taxes or motor vehicle
taxes on [Indians]." 5 2 While that case does mention § 1151, the page
cited by Cohen's does not. Rather, the case discusses § 1151 as it per-
tains to the inability of states to tax'5 3 members living not only on reser-
vations, but anywhere in "Indian country" as defined by § 1151.154 While
this case demonstrates the extension of § 1151 to a civil context, the ex-
tension is made out of deference to tribal sovereignty.'55 Therefore, this
case supports the proposition that § 1151 can be applied in civil contexts,
but only to the extent that states generally do not have jurisdiction to tax
within "Indian country." The acceptance in HRI III of § 1151's valid
application to civil matters illustrates how, by distorting precedent, ex-
tensions of § 1151 have progressed from respecting tribal sovereignty to
seizing it.
The Tenth Circuit in HRI III cited Venetie and Cohen's to support
the EPA's linkage of "Indian lands" in the SDWA to "Indian country" in
§ 1151.is6 At bottom, the authorities the HRI III majority used to support
the application of § 1151 are not persuasive. The Venetie and Cohen's
trails lead to footnotes that do not justify applying § 1151 to determine
jurisdiction for mining purposes. Rather, the precedential cases listed in
the various footnotes, at best, apply to the extension of criminal jurisdic-
146. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 223 n.10.
147. HRIIII, 608 F.3d 1131, 1138 (10th Cir. 2010)(en banc).
148. COHEN'S, supra note 9, § 3.04[l] at 182.
149. Id. at 182 n.333.
150. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208 n.5 (1987) (citing
DeCoteau v. Dist. Cnty. Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975)).
151. 508 U.S. 114, 128 (1993).
152. Id. at 116.
153. See id. at 128.
154. Id. at 123.
155. Seeid.at 126.
156. When the EPA, in 1984, linked the definition of "Indian lands" in the SDWA to "Indian
country" under § 1151, the Supreme Court had already applied § 1151 in most of the cases discussed
in this section.
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tion to cover tax obligations and debt collection and to keep states from
taxing Indians in Indian country. At worst, reliance on the cited authority
allows the federal government to further encroach upon Indian sover-
eignty, as shown by the HRJ III holding.
Apparently, the doctrine of stare decisis trumps any injustice lev-
eled against Native Americans through the federal intrusion into tribal
sovereignty. Although the Tenth Circuit was bound to apply EPA's defi-
nition of "Indian lands" under Venetie's interpretation of § 1151, reliance
on the particular authority cited, as shown by HR III, threatens the abil-
ity of the Navajo Nation to protect its drinking water sources from con-
tamination.
B. Implications of Granting Jurisdiction to New Mexico
As a result of HRI III, the Tribe, despite its ban on uranium min-
ing, 157 will not be able to prevent devastation of tribal land from uranium
mining and, more importantly, the contamination of a source of drinking
water for its people. Although the EPA has not yet granted UIC permit-
ting authority to the Navajo for Class III wells, it could do so in the fu-
ture, and thereby give the Navajo control over the fate of the aquifer that
Hydro seeks to mine.
Because the court held that Hydro's land is not "Indian country,"
Hydro must get its UIC permit from NMED rather than the EPA, which
controls tribal permits. Although NMED regulations must be as stringent
as those of the EPA, 5 Hydro does not have to get approval from the
Navajo, who use the aquifer for drinking waterl59 and who would have
input to the EPA permit process.1 60
When the EPA approved NMED's request for an aquifer exemption
in 1989,161 it concluded that the aquifer did not serve, and would not in
the future serve, as a source for drinking water. 162 Currently, however,
the aquifer serves as a drinking water source for thousands of people. 163
157. See Dine Natural Resources Protection Act of 2005, NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§ 1303 (2005).
158. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h, 300h-1 (2006); HRII, 198 F.3d 1224, 1232 (10th Cir. 2000); see
also Bradford D. Cooley, The Navajo Uranium Ban: Tribal Sovereignty v. National Energy De-
mands, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 393, 397 (2006).
159. Brief of Intervenor-Respondent Navajo Nation, supra note 110, at 12; E-mail from Chris
Shuey, Dir. of the Uranium Impact Assessment Program, Sw. Research & Informational Ctr., to
Andrew Brooks, Student, Denver Univ. Sturm Coll. of Law (Sept. 17, 2010, 22:09 MST) (on file
with author).
160. See Memorandum from Alvin L. Alm, Deputy Adm'r to Assistant Adm'rs et al. 5 (Nov. 8,
1984) (on file with author); see also James M. Grijalva, The Origins ofEPA's Indian Program, 15
KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 191, 290 (2006).
161. HRII, 198 F.3d at 1234.
162. HRI III, 608 F.3d 1131, 1140 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
163. Brief of Intervenor-Respondent, supra note 110, at 12; E-mail from Chris Shuey to An-
drew Brooks, supra note 159. Apparently, the discrepancy exists because the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission "averaged good quality groundwater from outside the ore zone with bad quality water
from inside the ore zone for an average pre-mining water quality that look[ed] bad." E-mail from
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Because HRI III ruled that New Mexico has jurisdiction over Hydro's
land, Hydro will seek its permit from NMED.1 64
Unlike the EPA, New Mexico does not grant "aquifer exemptions,"
but it will grant "temporary aquifer designation status" for certain Class
III wells.1 6 5 Temporary aquifer designation status allows the mining of
aquifers that can be used as sources for drinking water as long as the
aquifer, in whole or a "portion thereof," (1) does not serve as a "domestic
or agricultural water supply"16 6 and (2) either is currently situated in a
"location which makes recovery of water for drinking or agricultural
purposes" impractical1 6 7 or is already so contaminated that "render[ing]
that water fit for human consumption or agricultural use" is impracti-
cal.168 In addition, miners must show that, once mining operations are
complete, they will restore the groundwater's quality to pre-mining lev-
els or better. 169
To comply with these regulations, Hydro must show that the portion
of the aquifer it seeks to mine is "not currently used" as a domestic water
supply.170 Because thousands of people currently use the aquifer for
drinking water,171 Hydro will have to argue that only the portion it will
mine is not currently used for drinking water. Specifically, because New
Mexico regulations require measurement of a minimum of one-quarter
mile surrounding the well site to determine the toxicity of an aquifer,172
Hydro must show that the water in the portion of the aquifer within one-
quarter mile around the proposed uranium in situ injection and recovery
wells is too toxic to be used for domestic or agricultural use.
Additionally, Hydro will have to show that it will restore the
groundwater's quality. Multiple authorities explain that restoration of
groundwater to pre-mining conditions after ISL mining is impossible. 173
Eric Jantz, Staff Attorney, N.M. Envtl. Law Ctr., to Andrew Brooks, Student, Denver Univ. Sturm
Coll. of Law (Sept. 22, 2010, 3:01 MST) (on file with author). The issue is moot, though, because
HRI will have to get a new permit from New Mexico before it can mine, and therefore a new calcu-
lation would be made. Telephone Interview with William C. Olson, Chief, N.M. Ground Water
Quality Bureau (Sept. 17, 2010).
164. E-mail from Eric Jantz, Staff Attorney, N.M. Envtl. Law Ctr., to Andrew Brooks, Student,
Denver Univ. Sturm Coll. of Law (Sept. 19, 2010, 10:45 MST) (on file with author).
165. See N.M. CODE R. § 20.6.2.5101(C) (LexisNexis 2010); N.M. CODE R. §
20.6.2.5103(A)(2).
166. N.M. CODE R. § 20.6.2.5103(C)(1).
167. N.M. CODE R. § 20.6.2.5103(C)(2)(a).
168. N.M. CODE R. § 20.6.2.5103(C)(2)(b).
169. See N.M. CODE R. § 20.6.2.5101(C)(2) (mandating that discharge permits address the
manner by which the permit holder will ensure that affected ground water will not have excess levels
of toxic pollutants); see also N.M. CODE R. § 20.6.2.3103 (listing various pollutants and the accept-
able concentrations thereof in New Mexico groundwater).
170. N.M. CODE R. § 20.6.2.5103(C)(1).
171. See Brief of Intervenor-Respondent Navajo Nation, supra note 110, at 12-15; see also E-
mail from Chris Shucy to Andrew Brooks, supra note 159.
172. See N.M. CODE R. § 20.6.2.5202(B).
173. SUSAN HALL, GROUNDWATER RESTORATION AT URANIUM IN-SITU RECOVERY MINES,
SOUTH TEXAS COASTAL PLAIN 30 (2009) (concluding that no ISL mine in the U.S. returned post-
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The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commissionl 7 4 (NRC) admitted as
much in an August 2010 report. 175 Responding to comments that "resto-
ration of groundwater to baseline values for all groundwater constituents
in any ISL wellfield to date" has not been accomplished, the NRC stated
that "to date, restoration to backgroundwater quality for all constituents
has proven to be not practically achievable at licensed NRC [ISL]
,,l76sites.
Although New Mexico is not certain to grant Hydro's petition for
temporary aquifer designation status, approval could result in contamina-
tion of a Navajo drinking water source.
C. A Proposal Respecting Both Tribal Sovereignty and Venetie
The decision in HRI III, while correct under the SDWA and Vene-
tie, undermines the legislative intent behind § 1151 of avoiding checker-
board jurisdiction1 77 by reading out the word "communities" from §
1151(b). If New Mexico approves Hydro's permit, HRI III will lead to
the mining of an aquifer that the Navajo use for drinking water, ignoring
the Navajo's uranium mining ban. These problems can be remedied with
a simple solution. 178
Because the EPA chose to equate "Indian lands" in the SDWA to
"Indian country," as defined under § 1151,179 it can simply change its
definition of "Indian lands." Disassociation of § 1151 with the SDWA
would also dispose of the concomitant problems arising from reliance on
Venetie, which interpreted § 1151(b).
mining groundwater to pre-mining conditions based on data from Texas), available at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2009/1143/pdf/OF09-1143.pdf; Impacts of Uranium In-Situ Leaching, WISE
URANIUM PROJECT, http://www.wise-uranium.org/uisl.html (last updated Nov. 20, 2010); E-mail
from Eric Jantz to Andrew Brooks, supra note 164.
174. "[T]he NRC regulates in situ recovery facilities." Uranium Recovery, U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMM'N, http://www.nrc.gov/materials/uranium-recovery.html (last visited Apr. 1,
2011).
175. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE
MOORE RANCH ISR PROJECT IN CAMPBELL COUNTY, WYOMING: SUPPLEMENT TO THE GENERIC
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR IN-SITU LEACH URANIUM MILLING FACILITIES B-36
(2010). Thanks to Eric Jantz for directing me to this report.
176. Id. (emphasis added). This statement directly contradicts one that the International Atomic
Energy Agency made in 2005. "[W]ith nearly three decades of operations, the [U.S.] ISL
mining industry has never caused a serious environmental, health or safety risk or failed to
restore an aquifer at one of its projects." INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, GUIDEBOOK ON
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR IN SITU LEACH MINING PROJECTS 56 (2005) (emphasis
added).
177. The holding in HRI III was that Section 8 was not "Indian country," HRI III, 608 F.3d
1131, 1166 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc), and therefore New Mexico retains UIC permitting jurisdic-
tion over Section 8. The adjacent Section 17 was held to be "Indian country," HRII, 198 F.3d 1224,
1254 (10th Cir. 2000), and, therefore, EPA retains UIC permitting jurisdiction there.
178. The HRI III majority suggested such a possibility: "EPA may seek to ... unhitch[] its UIC
permitting authority from § 1151." HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1166.
179. 40 C.F.R. § 144.3 (2011).
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EPA should change the definition of "Indian lands" to refer to areas
that are occupied or substantially surrounded by tribal lands.' 80 Two ele-
ments should be used to make such a determination, factors that the Su-
preme Court in Venetie implicitly approved, but did not use, in interpret-
ing § 1151(b): "the degree of federal ownership of and control over the
area, and the extent to which the area was set aside for the use, occu-
pancy, and protection of dependent Indian peoples."' 8 To achieve ad-
ministrative ease and judicial efficiency, the EPA should set specific
targets or thresholds that the areas must meet to constitute "Indian land."
For example, an area consisting of land, 50.1% of which is controlled by
the federal government and was set aside for Indians, could constitute
"Indian lands." Specific thresholds should also be used to define "area,"
such as requiring an analysis of land within a radius of, for example,
three miles of the disputed land. EPA should specify such thresholds
after receiving input from all interested parties: namely, the tribes, the
states, the federal government, and private landowners. Specificity will
allow both Indian communities and private parties to determine whether
disputed land constitutes "Indian lands" without the need for courts to
undergo an unpredictable post hoc analysis. Such specificity would avert
the HRI III majority's issues with Watchman "community of reference"
test, while simultaneously conforming to congressional authority.
Hydro's land would constitute "Indian lands" under such a defini-
tion. Applying the first element, Hydro's parcel on Section 8 would be
subject to EPA jurisdiction because "[t]he government has set aside 78%
of the land in the [Navajo Church Rock] Chapter for the use of Indians
either as trust land either for the tribe or for individuals in the form of
allotments." 82 Similarly, the second element leads to the same conclu-
sion because "the federal government retains title to 92% of the land in
the Chapter, and[,] as . . . owner [in fee,] certainly retains superinten-
dence over the land." 83
Ideally, the EPA would then delegate to the Navajo UIC permitting
authority over such land. This would give the Tribe the most respect for
its sovereignty and allow it to make its own decisions regarding its land
and the resources beneath such land. Even if the EPA retained jurisdic-
tion, the Navajo would be able to provide input when reviewing UIC
applications.
The advantages of such a definition would outweigh the disadvan-
tages. First, it would allow courts to avoid the checkerboard jurisdiction
problems resulting from Venetie and HRI III because interested parties
180. The proposal incorporates Indian reservations and Indian allotments as described in
§ 1151(a) and (c), respectively, into the definition of "Indian lands."
181. Venetie II, 522 U.S. 520, 531 n.7 (1998) (quoting Venetie1, 101 F.3d 1286, 1301 (9th Cir.
1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. HR IIII, 608 F.3d at 1181 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
183. Id.at1182.
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would be able to determine upfront whether land constituted "Indian
lands." Second, the new definition would allow courts to respect tribal
sovereignty. In Hydro's case, if the Navajo were granted UIC permitting
authority from the EPA, the permit would be refused. If EPA retained
UIC permitting authority, EPA would seek input from the Chapter, and
the Chapter would emphasize the Navajo's ban on uranium mining, thus
allowing a certain level of respect for Navajo sovereignty.
Although the proposed definition of "Indian lands" breathes new
life into the "degree of federal ownership" and "extent set aside" factors
abrogated by Venetie, it does not resurrect the previous Ninth and Tenth
Circuit tests in their entirety. Rather, the proposal consists of the "more
relevant [factors]"l 84 adopted by the Ninth Circuit. Although courts may
analogize the proposed definition to Venetie, they would not be bound by
it because Venetie interpreted § 1151(b) and the proposed definition
would no longer be tethered to that section of the federal criminal code.
To avoid the § 1151 analogy, the EPA could, in the new definition of
"Indian lands," expressly proscribe reliance on § 1151 jurisprudence.' 8 5
CONCLUSION
The decision of HRI III demonstrates the Tenth Circuit's preference
for predictability over respect for tribal sovereignty. Although the deci-
sion allows property owners and authorities to easily determine which
government has jurisdiction, it relies on a criminal statute that was en-
acted to facilitate consistent enforcement of criminal law by federal
authorities. As a result of the opinion, Hydro must obtain temporary des-
ignation status not from the Navajo, but from the State of New Mexico
for its Section 8 land, in addition to an aquifer exemption from the EPA
for its adjacent Section 17 land. Should New Mexico allow Hydro to
mine, the Navajo community could suffer the contamination of a primary
drinking water source. This result may be avoided if EPA either grants
the Tribe UIC permitting authority or unlinks its definition of "Indian
184. Venetie II, 522 U.S. at 531 n.7.
185. Alternatively, Congress could amend the SDWA to drop the term "Indian lands" alto-
gether. Because aquifers are underground and do not follow land borders, tying jurisdiction to the
land under which the aquifer sits is certain to lead to disputes, as evidenced by HRiill. One possibil-
ity already exists in the oil recovery context. See, e.g., Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Okla. v. United
States, 966 F.2d 583, 585 (10th Cir. 1992). Congress could mandate all overlying landowners to
enter into "unitization agreements" before any permits are granted. See generally BOSSELMAN ET
AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 310-11 (2nd Ed. 2006) (describing such agree-
ments in the oil recovery context and problems with arriving at such agreements). Unitization
agreements, however, are not a panacea. Because the Navajo are unlikely to agree to any extraction
of uranium from aquifers under Navajo land, Congress may force capitulation if the nation's need
for uranium becomes more urgent. Forced capitulation, then, would negate any respect for tribal
sovereignty. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a, 396d (2006) (giving the Secretary of the Interior discretion to
approve oil and gas unitization agreements involving Indian tribes). But see 25 C.F.R. 211.28(b)
(2011) (stating that "the Secretary [of the Interior] shall consult with the Indian mineral owner prior
to making a determination concerning [a unitization agreement]").
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lands" from § 1151. A two-part test that analyzes the extent to which the
federal government has set aside and controls a particular area would
both limit checkerboard jurisdiction and, more importantly, allow tribes
to retain the power to control the destiny of their valuable resources.
Andrew Brooks*
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